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WATER RIGHTS
Is Georgia really across the Savannah Riverfrom South
Carolina?




(Docket No. 74, Original)
Argument Date:]an. 8, 1990
The northernmost branch of the Savannah River is
usually thought of as the border separating Georgia from
its neighbor to the northeast, South Carolina. For most pur-
poses, and in most stretches of the Savannah River, that
popular understanding comports with modern law, histor-
ical documents and the needs of the states to have a cer-
tain boundary dividing their respective territories and
spheres of sovereign authority.
As it turns out, in this case Georgia asks the United States
Supreme Court to declare that the popular understanding
is inaccurate as a matter of current law and historical rec-
ord and fails to meet the needs of the states in the asser-
tion of their regulatory authority over areas that now lie
to the north of the northernmost branch of the Savannah
River. Triggering the need for the Court's intervention are
both natural and man-made changes in the river's chan-
nel that have caused the channel to move southward in
its downstream reaches near the Atlantic Ocean.
ISSUES
This is a case presenting highly technical issues concern-
ing the methods by which state boundaries and their lateral
seaward extensions are drawn. The legal doctrines of accre-
tion (water's gradual and imperceptible addition of sedi-
ment to a shoreline) and avulsion (a sudden and perceptible
loss or addition to land as the result of an abrupt change
in a stream or river's channel) come into play because the
boundary under review is formed by a river whose chan-
nel has moved over time.
Other even more arcane doctrines control the process
of extending the boundary seaward after the landward
boundaries are fixed. This case also presents unique issues
of interpretation involving the 1787 Treaty of Beaufort,
which made the river the boundary, and the clarifying in-
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terpretation given to that treaty by the Supreme Court's
1922 decision in Georgia v. South Carolina, 257 U.S. 516.
FACTS
The current border squabble between Georgia and
South Carolina descends from ancient lineage. Legally, its
starting point is the 1787 Treaty of Beaufort, a concise
document ratified by Georgia, South Carolina and the
United States as provided for by the then-current Articles
of Confederation. That treaty, however, was forged to set-
tle a simmering boundary dispute between Georgia and
South Carolina traceable to the letters of patent that King
George II issued to Oglethorpe in 1732.
The principal thrust of the Treaty of Beaufort was that
the northernmost branch of the Savannah River should be
the boundary between the two states. In an apparent ef-
fort to make clear what that meant in regard to islands in
the river, the Treaty provided, "reserving all the is-
lands ... to Georgia." Time and events provided a challenge
to the Treaty of Beaufort's clarity as the river's channel
moved slowly southward, uniting former islands with the
South Carolina bank, building new islands and changing
the channel through which most navigation was accom-
plished. In part the changes were the result of natural
phenomena as the river carried sediments downstream and
deposited them in its delta. Some of the changes were the
result of human intervention, primarily that of the United
States Army Corps of Engineers, which erected structures
in aid of navigation and otherwise improved the river's
channels.
The legal proceedings in state boundary cases all take
place in the United States Supreme Court as part of the
Court's constitutionally conferred original jurisdiction in
cases between two or more states. The Court appoints a
Special Master, in this case Walter E. Hoffman, to receive
evidence and write a report to the Court recommending
a resolution of the dispute. Here this was done in two parts,
the first report delineating the points of dispute and recit-
ing the governing law, and the second report suggesting
a proposed boundary for adoption by the Court.
The most hotly contested areas under litigation are
former channel islands, some of which did not emerge un-
til after 1787. These islands are now, through the action
of the Corps of Engineers in dredging and filling, high
ground affixed to the South Carolina side of the river.
These areas are of substantial present value for port ac-
tivities capable of generating economic benefits that each
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state is eager to claim as its own.
For those familiar with the region, a list of disputed areas
is as follows: a small unnamed island west of Pennyworth
Island; an unnamed island east of Pennyworth Island re-
ferred to as "Tidegate Island"; the Barnwell Islands; south-
eastern Denwill; Jones Island; Horseshoe Shoal and Oyster
Bed Island. Regulatory jurisdiction disputes that will be
settled by the Court's decision of this case involve the
mouth of the river generally and the lateral seaward bound-
ary between the states.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
State boundary dispute litigation is routinely of limited
significance. While the precise location of any given
boundary often has important consequences for the areas
under review, most determinations are sui generis, owing
to their application of settled law to site-specific facts.
This case is of that mold. Hanging in the balance are a
few commercially attractive harbor sites for which Geor-
gia and South Carolina are vying. Also, at least one
acrimonious dispute over fishery licensing and fish-stock
depletion led South Carolina to refuse a Georgia extradi-
tion order that sought to reach a South Carolina boat cap-
tain for violating Georgia catch limits in disputed waters.
To those few souls directly affected by the boundary in
this case, it carries significance; others may find it only
interesting.
ARGUMENTS (exceptions to the report ofthe spe-
cial master)
For the State ofGeorgia (Counsel of Record, Patricia
T Barmeyer; Assistant Attorney General, 132 State judi-
cial Building, Atlanta, GA 30334; telephone (404)
656-3389):
1. The Special Master has misconstrued the 1787 Treaty
of Beaufort by locating the Barnwell Islands in South
Carolina.
2. As a matter of fact, Georgia has not acquiesced in the
location of the Barnwell Islands, nor has South Caro-
lina acquired any prescriptive right to those islands.
3. Near the mouth of the river, the Special Master mis-
takenly located the boundary in the navigation chan-
nel rather than in the geographic middle as required
by the 1922 ruling of the Supreme Court.
4. The Special Master erred in using the "right angle
method."
5. Islands of natural formation are in Georgia even if they
emerged only after the 1787 Treaty of Beaufort.
6. The lateral seaward boundary between the two states
should commence in the geographic middle of the
river.
Issue No.8
For the State of South Carolina (Counsel of Record,
Kenneth P Woodington, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, PO. Box 11549, Columbia, SC 29211; telephone
(803) 734-3680):
1. The Special Master erred in finding that additions to
the Denwill tract formed by sedimentation and dredge
deposits over a 40-year period were avulsive.
2. The Special Master erred in awarding the Horseshoe
Shoals area to Georgia when the evidence showed that
the area was formed over several decades as a result of
Corps of Engineers training works and the deposit of
dredge fill.
3. The additions to Bird Island were formed in the same
manner as the additions to the Denwill and Horseshoe
Shoals areas and should be treated in an identical fash-
ion to those other areas.
4. The Special Master erroneously drew the lateral seaward
boundary north of the overlap of the coastal fronts of
the two states, thereby causing that boundary to cut
across the South Carolina coastal front.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Neither Party
The United States of America (Counsel ofRecord, Ken-
neth W Starr; Solicitor General, Department ofjustice,
Washington, DC 20530; telephone (202) 633-2217):
1. The Report of the Special Master assumes, unnecessar-
ily and incorrectly, that this nation has used the "straight
baseline" method to determine the location of the
coastline of the United States.
The State of Alaska (Counsel of Record, G. Thomas
Koester; Assistant Attorney General, Alaska Department
of Law, Po. Box K, juneau, AK 99811; telephone (907)
465-3600):
1. The Court should reject the United States' suggested
rationale for not adopting the Special Master's "straight
baseline" discussion because it is unnecessary to the
decision of this case.
2. The Supreme Court has never concluded that the use
of the "straight baseline" method is contrary to historic
maritime boundary delimitation in the United States.
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